Discretionary policy in a small open economy: exchange rate regimes and multiple equilibria by Himmels, Christoph & Kirsanova, Tatiana
 
 
 
 
 
Himmels, C. and Kirsanova, T. (2018) Discretionary policy in a small open 
economy: exchange rate regimes and multiple equilibria. Journal of 
Macroeconomics, 56, pp. 53-64. (doi:10.1016/j.jmacro.2018.01.001) 
 
This is the author’s final accepted version. 
 
There may be differences between this version and the published version. 
You are advised to consult the publisher’s version if you wish to cite from 
it. 
 
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/154913/ 
                    
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deposited on: 08 January 2018 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Enlighten – Research publications by members of the University of Glasgow 
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk  
 
Discretionary Policy in a Small Open Economy: Exchange Rate
Regimes and Multiple Equilibria 
Christoph Himmelsy
University of Cardi¤
Tatiana Kirsanovaz
University of Glasgow
January 4, 2018
Abstract
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1 Introduction
Choosing the exchange rate regime for an open economy is one of the classic macroeconomic
problems. The conventional idea behind an exchange rate peg is that it will anchor ination
expectations and increase trade through lower uncertainty and smaller adjustment costs. It may
also encourage investment into long-term projects due to lower exchange rate risk/ transaction
costs and therefore has a positive economic impact (see e.g. Cote (1994) and Prasad, Rogo¤,
Wei, and Kose (2003) for the potential benets of xed exchange rate regimes). However, being
prone to speculative attacks hard pegs became less popular, especially after the Asian crisis of
1997. On the other hand recent evidence suggests that monetary authorities in many developing
countries still see targeting the nominal exchange as a priority, despite that they o¢ cially claim
to have oating regimes.1 Developing and emerging countries like Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand,
South Korea, Turkey, Russia adopted de jure exible exchange rate regimes, but de facto the
exchange rate remained one of the most important if not the only target of their monetary policy
in the post 1997 decade.2
Despite a relatively tranquil post-1997 decade in most developing and emerging countries,
the exchange rate volatility under these soft pegsvaried over time. There is also a number of
studies that document di¢ culties in explaining sudden changes in regimesbetween periods of
high and low volatilities.3 Theoretical explanations for these di¤erent regimes include non-rational
behavior, non-linear decisions or heterogeneity of agents like the presence of noise traders(see
Jeanne and Rose (2002) for an important example).
1See e.g. Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005) and Calvo and Reinhart (2002).
2See Rahmatsyah, Rajaguru, and Siregar (2002) for Thailand, Dogolnar (2002) for Turkey, Korea, Malaysia,
Indonesia and Pakistan, and Arize, Osang, and Slottje (2000) for 13 developing countries. Furthermore, evidence
by Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2004) suggests that partial exchange rate targeting is still the predominant monetary
policy regime in many developing countries.
3See e.g. Engel and Hamilton (1990), Clarida et al. (2003) or Chen (2006) who apply Markov-switching models
to explain these changes. These models have also been employed to describe exchange rate behaviour in oating
regimes. However, their success is still a matter of debate see e.g. again Clarida et al. (2003) and Engel, Mark,
and West (2007).
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In this paper we o¤er a di¤erent theoretical approach which can contribute to the explanation
of these empirical observations. Using a simple small open economy model in the spirit of Galí
and Monacelli (2005) but with incomplete nancial markets (Benigno, 2009) we demonstrate that
the way monetary policy is conducted might be responsible for the existence of time periods with
large di¤erence in the volatility of all macroeconomic variables, including the exchange rate.
Specically, we demonstrate that discretionary monetary policy may result in multiple equi-
libria, consistent with di¤erent sets of beliefs of the private sector and the policymaker. A policy
maker responds to a state that is at least partly determined by a forecast of his behavior. Di¤er-
ent sets of beliefs about the future policy generate di¤erent future courses for a policy maker to
follow. Therefore, if the economy is hit by a shock, it can follow one of several adjustment paths,
where the volatility along these paths is di¤erent, resulting in di¤erent welfare outcomes.4
Once multiple equilbiria are observed, coordination on the best equilibrium may be di¢ cult.
Discretionary policy is time-consistent by construction, so if the current policymaker perceives a
particular even inferior policy of future policymakers, it will be optimal for the policymaker to
implement the same policy in the current period. A unilateral deviation of the current policymaker
from the perceived policy plan is not benecial to this policymaker, and the resulting discretionary
policy is a Nash equilibrium in the game of consequent policymakers, see e.g. Oudiz and Sachs,
1985; Dennis and Kirsanova, 2017. In other words, the existence of multiple equilibria implies
that consequent policymakers may fail to coordinate on the best equilibrium or, equivalently, fall
into an expectation trap.5
This paper compares and contrasts ination targeting with soft exchange rate targeting under
discretionary policy. Multiplicity arises in both cases. Under conventional ination targeting the
model has three stable discretionary equilibria. If the economy is hit by a cost-push shock, in two
4The existence of multiple equilibria under discretionary policy in non-linear models has been well established
by King and Wolman (2004) and Albanesi et al. (2003). Blake and Kirsanova (2012) show that multiplicity can
also occur in LQ RE models under discretionary policy.
5See Cooper and John (1988) for a detailed discussion about coordination failures and multiple equilibria.
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of the three equilibria the monetary policy maker raises the interest rate and reduces demand.
Although the terms of trade improve, their positive e¤ect on marginal costs is dominated by
the e¤ect of lower demand. The private sector reduces its holdings of net foreign assets creating
a persistent decit. The decit and all macroeconomic variables converge back to the steady
state at a very slow rate. In contrast, in the second equilibrium the cost push shock is initially
accommodated, and the large depreciation of the terms of trade causes the net foreign assets to
accumulate. Once the level of assets is high, the interest rate is raised and ination is brought
back to its base. This delayed increase in the interest rate also brings net foreign assets and
all macroeconomic variables  back to the base line very quickly. In the presence of multiple
equilibria, a coordination failure occurs: the agents can choose any of them and a sunspot decides
which one will realize.
A similar coordination failure may also happen under exchange rate targeting, either partial
or strict. The policy maker introduces an additional positive weight in an otherwise standard
policy objective  that punishes the volatility of the nominal exchange rate. There is still a
conventional discretionary equilibrium in which the exchange rate remains on target. However,
as it is acceptable but costly that the future exchange rate can deviate from the target, the
economic agents may coordinate on the second admissible equilibrium, in which the exchange
rate is volatile around the target.
The assumption of incomplete nancial markets is crucial for our results. A discretionary
policy maker takes current and future economic conditions into account, but can only commit
to current behavior. An endogenous predetermined state is a vehicle through which the cur-
rent economic condition is a¤ected by the past behavior of the rational private sector which is
again based on a forecast of future economic conditions and future policy. Blake and Kirsanova
(2012) demonstrate that the presence of such a state is a necessary condition for a multiplicity of
equilibria to arise.
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Our model abstracts from many features that may characterize developing countries, e.g.
capital controls or incomplete exchange rate pass-through. Also, we use a relatively standard
parameterization of model parameters rather than estimate them and, as such, present numerical
examples, not quantitative statements with any empirical content. However, we show that the
assumption of incomplete nancial markets in combination with discretionary monetary policy is
su¢ cient to generate expectation traps, i.e. multiple policy equilibria which are associated with
di¤erent volatilities of all macroeconomic variables. Our results are not restricted to this simple
model, but will also prevail in more detailed settings. Both assumptions incomplete nancial
markets and discretionary monetary policy are justiable for developing countries: Such coun-
tries have restricted access to international nancial markets and the ability of policymakers to
precommit to future policies is generally weaker than in developed countries.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next Section presents the model.
Section 3 discusses the policy equilibria for an ination targeting regime and under nominal
exchange rate targeting. Section 4 concludes.
2 Model Highlights
We use a workhorse small open economy model, based on Galí and Monacelli (2005) and De
Paoli (2009), with incomplete nancial markets as in Benigno (2009). Specically, there are two
countries: the small open economy (Home) and the rest of the world (Foreign). The size of
the Home economy is innitely small relative to the size of the Foreign economy, therefore the
economic performance and policy decisions do not have any impact on the rest of the world.
Each economy is populated by innity-living households and rms. Households consume two
goods, home- and foreign-produced, and their preferences reect home bias in consumption. The
law of one price holds. Firms are monopolistically competitive, and only use labor to produce
di¤erentiated tradable goods. Production takes place in two stages. First, there is a continuum
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of intermediate goods rms, which produce a di¤erentiated input. In the second stage nal goods
producers combine these inputs into output and sell them to households in both countries. Mo-
nopolistic competition and sticky prices give a meaningful role for monetary policy. Each country
has an independent scal authority, which nances spending by distortionary taxes and bonds.
Home bonds are not tradable and in zero net supply, while foreign bonds are internationally
tradable. Financial markets are incomplete, and the portfolio allocation is determined by trans-
action costs. All prots received by home country rms and nancial intermediaries are rebated
to home households. The Home country is subject to cost-push shocks. Full details of underlying
microfoundations of the model are given in Appendix A. As we demonstrate in Appendix A,
the model has unique deterministic steady state. In the following we present only the linearized
equations around it.
2.1 Private Sector Equilibrium
The household optimization problem for the small open economy H yields a consumption Euler
equation
c^t = Etc^t+1 + 

EtS^t+1   S^t

   (^{t   EtHt+1) ; (1)
where c^t denotes consumption, S^t is the terms of trade (relative price of foreign producer price
in terms of home producer price), ^Ht is Home producer price ination and {^t is the short term
nominal interest rate.6 Parameter  is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
and  is the degree of trade openness:
The rms optimization problem gives the standard New Keynesian Phillips curve for the
producer price ination
^Ht = ^t +

1 + 
l

 S^t + 1

c^t +

&   
l


y^t +
 l

g^t

+ Et^Ht+1; (2)
6Here and below, hatted variables indicate that they have been linearized relative to their steady states. Steady
state variables are denoted by letters without time subscript.
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where y^t is output, g^t is government spending, nanced by distortionary taxes, and ^t is an AR(1)
Home cost-push shock. Parameter & is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply and
 =  1 is a monopolistic markup which is related to the elasticity of substitution between home
goods : Parameter  denotes the household discount factor and the slope of the Phillips curve
 = (1  ) (1  ) = is a function of the Calvo (1983) probability of price change . Finally,
parameter  l is the steady state value of the labour income tax. The Home country maintains a
balanced budget, so the e¤ect of marginal cost on ination is scaled by the factor 1=

1 + 
l


.
The aggregate resource constraint can be written as
y^t = (1  ) c
y
c^t + 

(1  ) c
y
+
c
y

S^t + 
c
y
c^t +
g
y
g^t: (3)
where c^t is Foreign consumption. Parameter  is the elasticity of substitution between home and
foreign goods.
For the other, large and e¤ectively closed economy, the corresponding equations are
c^t = Etc^t+1   
 
{^t   EtFt+1

; (4)
y^t =
c
y
c^t +
g
y
g^t ; (5)
^Ft = 

1

c^t + &y^

t +
l

^lt

+ EtFt+1; (6)
bTt = %{^

t +
1


bTt 1   %^Ft +
g
y
g^t  
 l


^ lt +
1

c^t + (& + 1) y^

t +
l

^lt

; (7)
where bTt is normalized total real Foreign debt issued by the Foreign government and held by
Home and Foreign residents, parameter % = b
T
F
y .
Finally, the model is closed with the risk premium equation
{^t = {^

t + EtHt+1   Et^Ft+1 + EtS^t+1   S^t   

bt +  (1  ) S^t

; (8)
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the current account equation
0 =


c
y
y
y
(1   (1  ))  c

y
   (1  )

St + 
c
y
y
y
c^t + bt   bt 1 (9)
 c

y
c^t   {^t + ^Ft
and the denition of nominal exchange rate E^t
E^t = S^t   P^Ht + P^ Ft; (10)
where  is a Home portfolio adjustment cost parameter,  = bFy is a measure of Foreign debt held
by non-residents in the steady state.
The system of ten equations (1)-(10) describes the private sector equilibrium and determines
c^t; y^t; ^Ht; bt; b
T
t ; c^

t ; y^

t ; ^

Ft; E^t and S^t; given the policy variables {^t; {^

t ; g^t; g^

t ; ^
l
t :
2.2 Small Open Economy Model in LQ Policy Framework
In the following we will only consider the dynamics of the small open economy and treat all
variables of the large closed economy as exogenous shocks. Hence, we only work with the system
of equations (1)-(3) and (8)-(10). Endogenous variables are c^t; y^t; ^Ht; bt; E^t and S^t, the policy
instrument is {^t. The cost push shock ^t as well as government spending g^t is treated as exogenous.
System (4)-(7) determines other exogenous processes c^t ; y^t ; ^

Ft; b
T
t ; {^

t ; g^

t ; ^
l
t :
System (1)-(3), (8)-(10) can be represented in the following form, suitable for standard policy
analysis in a linear-quadratic (LQ) framework. For convenience we introduce a new variable
ut = c^t    (1  ) S^t (11)
which measures the excess consumption under incomplete nancial markets, as ut  0 under
international risk sharing. Substituting out consumption and the interest rate (using equation
(8)), the consumption Euler equation can be re-written as
ut = Etut+1 + 

bt +  (1  ) S^t

    {^t   ^Ft+1 : (12)
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The Phillips curve becomes
^Ht = ^t +


1 + (&  H)

( (1  ) + ) (1  ) cy +  c

y


1 + gy
 S^t (13)
+


1
 +

&   gy

(1  ) cy


1 + gy
 ut
+


&   gy

 c

y c^

t +
g
y

& + 1  gy

g^t


1 + gy
 + Et^Ht+1
and the current account equation is given by
bt =
1

bt 1 +
1


(1  )+ 

c
y
   (1  (   ) (1  )) c
y
y
y

St (14)
 

c
y
y
y
ut +
1



c
y
c^t +  ({^

t   ^Ft)

:
In the following we will treat the terms of trade S^t as policy instrument, as it only enters
contemporaneously in equations (12)-(14).7 The three endogenous variables in system (12)-(14)
are foreign debt bt; producer-price ination ^Ht and excess consumption ut. Once this system is
solved, the interest rate needed to deliver the optimal policy can be found from (8), consumption
can be recovered from equation (11) and output can be found from the aggregate demand equation
(3).
2.3 Monetary Policy Regimes
2.3.1 Ination Targeting
In this paper we assume that the following quadratic policy objective is delegated to the central
bank by either society or legislation (see e.g. Kam et al. (2009)):
W ITt =
1
2
Et
1X
s=t
s tm
 
2H;s + !yy^
2
s

; (15)
7This approach is common in the literature, see Clarida et al. (1999) where consumption is treated as policy
instrument and the interest rate is later reinstated from the Euler equation. Our approach is similar. Once the
solution is found, the interest rate can be reinstated from the risk premium equation.
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where m is monetary policymakers discount factor. The above policy objective has been shown
by Woodford (2003) to approximate the aggregate of individual utility functions in a closed
economy model with complete nancial markets. In our model, this approximation will not hold
up to the second order, but is frequently considered in the literature as a likely objective given
to the central bank. Where relevant, this policy objective also plays the role of social loss, so
all welfare losses are computed using metric (15).8
2.3.2 Nominal Exchange Rate Targeting
Under nominal exchange rate targeting the central bank uses the following objective
WEt =
1
2
Et
1X
s=t
s tm

(1  !e)
 
2H;s + !yy^
2
s

+ !eE^
2
s

; (16)
where we impose an additional weight !e on the stabilization of the nominal exchange rate around
its steady state value.
If !e = 0 then the objective (16) reduces to the standard ination targeting regime (15). If
!e = 1 then the objective (16) is equivalent to a strict exchange rate targeting regime:
WE1t =
1
2
Et
1X
s=t
s tm E^
2
s : (17)
This targeting regime has some similarities with a xed exchange rate regime. In particular, this
regime assumes that the policy maker announces the target, perhaps within a corridor (which we
do not model as binding in any way, so it does not a¤ect expectations of the private sector) and
implements policy to keep the exchange rate on target. The exchange rate, however, is allowed
to deviate from the target, although such deviations are costly.9
8Appendix B provides the robustness analysis to this form of policy objective.
9The peg is softas it is a result of optimisation policy and so is di¤erent from a hardpeg where the monetary
policy maker is prepared to sell any quantity of reserves at a given price to keep the exchange rate exactly on target.
A hard peg cannot be modeled within our framework of optimisation with a quadratic loss function because any
regime with quadratic loss function allows (costly) deviations from the parity.
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2.3.3 Policy, Policy Instrument and Solution
The central bank manipulates the short term interest rate to a¤ect the terms of trade S^ to
minimize loss (15) (or (16)) subject to system(12)-(14). A discretionary solution can be written
in the form of linear feedback rules
bt = byyt + bxxt; (18)
ut = Uyyt + Uxxt; (19)
^H;t = yyt +xxt; (20)
S^t = syyt + sxxt (21)
where yt denotes a vector of endogenous predetermined states, and xt denotes a vector of exoge-
nous predetermined states. In case of ination targeting vector yt = [bt 1] is a scalar, while in
case of nominal exchange rate targeting it is yt = [pHt 1; bt 1]: Vector xt contains the stochastic
component of the solution xITt = [^t] for all policy regimes we consider.
10 A representation in
the form of (18)-(21) is convenient to illustrate the multiplicity of discretionary equilibria.
2.4 Parameterization
The share of government spending to GDP, g=y and g=y; is set to 0.20 for each country. We set
! = bF
bTF
= 0:0 as the small open economy is unlikely to be a substantial non-resident holder of the
large countrys debt. We set % = b
T
F
y = 0:6 4 which reects a 60% annual debt to output ratio.
Parameters g=y, g=y; % and ! yield the steady state tax level needed to service debt 
l
 =
g
y and
l
 =
g
y + % (1  ) : Finally, we set the adjustment cost parameter  = 0:01 following Benigno
(2009). This implies a 10 basis point spread of the domestic interest rate over the foreign one.
We assume that the policymakers discount factor m = :
The model frequency is quarterly. The households discount factor  is set to 0.99 which gives
10Coe¢ cients b; u; ; s can be found by solving the rst order conditions. Our denition of discretion is conven-
tional, see e.g. Clarida et al. (1999).
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the steady state interest rate of 4% and the Calvo parameter  is set to 0.75 which implies the
average length of xed price contracts of about one year. Openness is set to  = 0:3. The inverse
of the intertemporal elasticity is set to  = 0:5; based on evidence in Attanasio and Weber (1995).
The elasticity between home goods  = 11 and the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labour supply
 = 3 are set consistently with most estimations of DSGE models (Liu and Mumtaz (2011),
Justiniano and Preston (2010), Chen et al. (2017)). The intertemporal elasticity of substitution
between domestic and foreign goods  is set to 1.5, see Albonico et al. (2016) and Adolfson et al.
(2008). Finally, following Galí and Monacelli (2005) cost push shocks in the domestic country and
the rest of the world follow AR(1) processes with persistence parameter 

= 0:4. The standard
deviation of a cost push shock is 0:005. We only consider one shock in our welfare computations,
as this does not a¤ect any of our results. Adding more shocks simply rescales the loss numbers
in a not-informative way.
3 Discretionary Policy and Expectations Traps
In this section we demonstrate that expectation traps are relevant for a monetary policymaker
in a small open economy.11 We rst consider standard ination targeting policy. To stabilize
ination, the policymaker must choose a plan on how quickly to bring the marginal costs back
to their steady state level. The policymaker may be expected to stabilize marginal costs slower
or faster, and multiple equilibria arise. Similarly, under soft exchange rate targeting, di¤erent
speeds of stabilization of the nominal exchange rate is possible.
11This section presents numerical examples, not quantitative statements with any empirical content.
11
3.1 Ination Targeting
3.1.1 Discretionary Policy Equilibrium
Consider the deterministic version of the model. The dynamic system of equations (12)-(14) can
be written as
ut = Etut+1 + ubbt + usS^t
^Ht = sS^t + uut + Et^Ht+1
bt =
1

bt 1 + bsSt   buut
where all coe¢ cients are given in Appendix D. Under ination targeting with policy objective
(15) optimal time-consistent control variables can be written in the form of (18)-(21):
ut = Ubbt 1;
^H;t = bbt 1;
S^t = sbbt 1:
where coe¢ cients satisfy the following Riccati equations
Ub = ~Ub + ~Ussb; (22)
b = ~b + ~ssb; (23)
V =

~b + ~ssb
2
+ !ss
2
b + V

1

  bu ~Ub +

bs   bu ~Us

sb
2
; (24)
sb =  

~s ~b + V

bs   bu ~Us

1
   bu ~Ub


V

bs   bu ~Us
2
+ ~2s + !s
 ; (25)
12
V denotes the value function matrix, and we introduced new notation using equations (22)-(23):
~b (Ub;b) : =
uUb +  (buub   buub + 1)b + uub
 (Ubbu + buub + 1)
;
~s (Ub;b) : =
(s + uus + (sbu + ubs) (ub + Ub) +  (bs   buus)b)
(Ubbu + buub + 1)
;
~Ub (Ub;b) : =
Ub + ub
 (Ubbu + buub + 1)
;
~Us (Ub;b) : =
us + Ubbs + bsub
Ubbu + buub + 1
:
System (22)-(25) has four non-linear equations for four unknown coe¢ cients, Ub;b; V; sb;
which determine the dynamic solution to system (18)-(21). As the original optimization problem
is certainty-equivalent, it is su¢ cient to solve the deterministic problem to nd Ub;b; V; sb and
then we can reinstate in the unique way all other coe¢ cients in (18)-(21).12
Each solution fUb;b; V; sbg to system (22)-(25) corresponds to a discretionary equilibrium.
3.1.2 Multiplicity of Policy Equilibria
Table 1 reports that system (22)-(25) has three distinct solutions, so that the model exhibits three
discretionary equilibria under ination targeting, which we label A, B, and C. In the following we
report the deterministic components of the solution and also reinstate the interest rate reaction
function in the form {^t = ibbt 1: The loss is computed for the stochastic model.
Table 1 shows that equilibria A and B share certain characteristics while equilibrium C
appears very di¤erent.13 In particular, the feedback coe¢ cients on ination, terms of trade
and the nominal interest rate in equilibrium C are all much larger in magnitude than those for
equilibria A and B, suggesting greater volatility in a stochastic economy. In addition, while the
nominal interest rate is lowered in response to higher foreign assets in equilibria A and B it is
raised markedly in equilibrium C. These three equilibria produce qualitatively and quantitatively
di¤erent economic dynamics, as shown in Figure 1 which plots the responses of key variables to a
12See e.g. Blake and Kirsanova (2012).
13The loss is measured in percentage of steady state consumption which needs to be sacriced to eliminate
stochastic volatility.
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Table 1: Multiple Discretionary Equilibria under Ination Targeting
Policy Private sector Implied response Speed of Value Average
Eqm. Reaction Reaction of interest rate adjustment function Loss
[sb]

Ub
b

[ib] max [V ] L;%C
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
A  0:1106

0:1013
0:0008

 0:0036 0:9534 8:9e-05 0.0166
B  0:1258

0:0950
 0:0867

 0:0856 0:9505 0:0713 0.0715
C  3:1888

0:0004
 0:8100

2:8586 0:0824 0:7127 0.4498
one-percent domestic mark up shock. To understand these results, and also to provide an intuition
for the rise of multiplicity, we look closer at the transmission mechanism of shocks under optimal
discretionary policy.
Monetary policy aims to stabilize ination and does it via inuencing the path for marginal
cost. The forward representation of the Phillips curve (13) can be written as
^H;t = Et
1X
s=t
s tm^cs +
1
1  
^t; (26)
where the real marginal costs can be expressed as14
m^cs = w1S^t + w2 (bt 1   bt) + w3"d;t: (27)
It is apparent that movements in mct and mct+1 are highly substitutable in terms of their e¤ect
on Ht and that there are multiple paths for mct that will return ination to target. These
di¤erent paths for real marginal costs are associated with di¤erent monetary policies and with
di¤erent performances in terms of the loss. Equation (27) shows that monetary policy can a¤ect
14Parameters w1 > 0; w2 > 0; w3 and the composite shock "d;t are given in Appendix C.
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mct through two distinct channels. The standard response to lower marginal cost is to tighten
monetary policy. In our case this means an improvement in the terms of trade, as w1 > 0 in
equation (27). Households will respond by reducing consumption and selling foreign assets as the
terms of trade drive the evolution of net foreign assets in equation (14). Alternatively, the policy
maker can conduct expansionary monetary policy which implies a depreciation of the terms of
trade, but also causes net foreign assets to accumulate.
The key for multiplicity is that the impact of S^t and bt on m^ct is in opposite directions. Notice
that a reduction in S^t causes a fall in bt and that S^t and bt have countervailing e¤ects on m^ct.
As a consequence, the desirability of each policy from the perspective of the period-t policymaker
depends on how future policymakers are expected to respond to movements in the stock of net
foreign assets.
Consider the case where future policymakers are expected to lower the interest rate and
depreciate the terms of trade in response to a rise in the stock of net foreign assets. Following
a positive cost push shock ^t, the current policy of raising the real interest rate and causing
S^t and bt to decline will successfully deliver lower real marginal costs and ination because the
boost in future real marginal costs caused by the decline in the stock of net foreign assets is
o¤set by lower terms of trade in the future. Under this approach, monetary policy responds to
the positive markup shock by contracting demand, lowering real marginal costs and ination. In
subsequent periods lowering interest rates and increasing the terms of trade as ination declines
allows the economy to recover, producing an equilibrium. Alternatively, if future policymakers
are expected to raise the interest rate and reduce the terms of trade in response to a higher stock
of net foreign assets, then a current policy that lowers the real interest rate and raises the terms
of trade can bring about a decline in ination by stimulating the accumulation of foreign assets.
This is despite the boost to S^t and mct today, because future policymakers respond to the higher
foreign assets by tightening monetary policy, producing another equilibrium.
15
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This is illustrated in Panel I of Figure 1. As anticipated, we nd that the behavior of the
economy is notably di¤erent in equilibria A (and B) and C. In equilibrium C monetary policy
accommodates cost-push shocks, but allows to bring the stock of assets back to the base line
quickly. The tight monetary policy in equilibrium A (and B) results in a large reduction in the
net foreign assets position with small but long-lasting e¤ects on all macroeconomic variables.
These three equilibria are obtained numerically by searching for a x-point in the policy-
makers response to the stock of foreign assets and plotted in Panel II of Figure 1. Given a
perceived policy reaction function (21) with feedback on debt sib we can compute the optimal
reaction of the private sector
 
U ib ;
i
b

using (22)-(23). Given the reaction of the private sector 
U ib ;
i
b

, we can solve the maximization problem of the central bank (24)-(24) to nd the value
function V and the best policy response, si+1b : In points where s
i+1
b = s
i
b we have a discretionary
equilibrium. There are three such points in Panel II of Figure 1.15 All three equilibria are private-
sector learnable, but only equilibria A and C are jointly learnable, as discussed in Dennis and
Kirsanova (2017). This implies that conventional methods of nding discretionary solution by
backwards induction (Oudiz and Sachs, 1985) can only nd equilibria A and C.
3.1.3 Robustness and the Role of Financial Markets
The discovered equilibria are robust to di¤erent calibrations of the model. Changes in ; ' and
bH=y
 result in minor shifts of points of intersection in Panel II Figure 1, preserving qualitative
di¤erences in the dynamics of the di¤erent equilibria. The intermediation cost parameter  does
not a¤ect the equilibria in a signicant way either. With  tending to zero transaction costs fall
and the degree of nancial integration rises. All three equilibria survive for any  > 0:16 However,
there is a discontinuity at  = 0; where the problem is isomorphic to the one under international
risk sharing, with private sector investing into state-contingent assets and one-period foreign
15Appendix D gives a sketch of a formal proof that there are only three equilibria. It also presents all formal
derivations and discusses the iterative procedure in detail.
16Checked numerically up to values  = 1e-8: See Appendix E.
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bonds is one of them. A unique discretionary equilibrium with properties similar to those in
equilibrium C can be obtained analytically. In this case equation (12) has unique solution ut = 0
and the greatly simplied system (22)-(25) has the unique solution17
Ub = 0;
b =   s
bs
;
V = (b + (s + bsb) sb)
2 + !ss
2
b + V

1

+ bssb
2
;
sb =   (s + bsb)b + V bs
V b2s + (s + bsb)
2 + !s
:
With  = 0 the dynamic system e¤ectively de-couples into the Phillips curve and the risk sharing
condition on the one hand, and the evolution of net foreign assets on the other hand. The evolution
of net foreign assets becomes irrelevant for decisions of the private sector and the policymaker.
Blake and Kirsanova (2012) demonstrate that for discretionary policy to generate multiplicity of
equilibria it is necessary to have at least one endogenous predetermined state in the model. With
 = 0 the state becomes irrelevant and multiplicity disappears: equilibrium C remains, while
equilibria A and B correspond to a single solution with zero feedback of all control variables on
net foreign assets. Solutions A and B produce explosive dynamics of the economy, and are ruled
out as discretionary equilibria by transversality conditions.18
3.1.4 Policy Delegation as Equilibrium Selection Mechanism
Can the multiplicity be eliminated by delegating a particular policy objective to the policymaker?
The answer is positive, and many such delegation schemes may exist. However, they do not
necessarily result in higher overall welfare. For example, the intrinsic property of equilibrium
C is that it implies a relatively fast adjustment of the endogenous predetermined state, foreign
assets. Making the fast adjustment costly may help to eliminate this equilibrium. Panel III in
17More details are available in Appendix F.
18 In this model we consider government debt. The results are una¤ected by the debt ownership structure.
Assuming that the foreign debt is privately-issued and its net supply is zero, would only a¤ect exogenous processes.
18
Figure 1 illustrates a policy delegation scheme where the policymaker minimizes the loss with an
additional penalty on changes in net foreign asset position
W IT;bt =
1
2
Et
1X
s=t
s tm

2H;s + !yy^
2
s + !b (bt   bt 1)2

: (28)
Panel III demonstrates that with !b > 0 the line s
i+1
b (s
i
b) shifts up, so points C and B eventually
disappear, once !b is su¢ ciently large. However, this policy results in substantial welfare losses in
the now equilibrium A. For our base line calibration, !b ' 32 results in an average loss of 0.4549,
which is slightly greater than loss of now eliminated equilibrium C and substantially greater than
the loss in equilibrium A with !b = 0; see column (7) in Table 1.
Table 2: E¤ect of Discounting under Ination Targeting
m 0.99 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.0
A 0.0166 0.0166 0.0166 0.0166 0.0166 0.0166 0.0166
C 0.4498 0.4499 0.4502 0.4512 0.4566 0.4751 
In contrast to the policy delegation scheme discussed in (28), the loss in the best equilibrium
is una¤ected if the monetary policymaker is impatient, m < ; see Table 2 which reports the
losses in equilibria A and C for di¤erent discount factors m:
19 Once the policymaker discounts the
future at a su¢ ciently high rate (m  0:08 for the base line calibration), only the best equilibrium
A survives.20 Equilibrium C relies on the ability of the policymaker to delay stabilization of
ination until future periods, which is ruled out by impatience. Table 2 demonstrates, however,
that the loss in the worst equilibrium C increases with the degree of impatience, and an inability
to choose the right discounting may result in a substantially worse outcome.
19This result is conditional on the form of the objective function. The above objective function contains only
forward-looking terms. Had we for example kept the change in NFA as a target, the loss in both equilibria would
change with discounting. However, for illustrative purposes we report the result for the standard ination targeting
regime. Here and below we use the socialobjective with discount factor  to calculate the loss.
20Numerical simulations produce a picture which is qualitatively similar to Panel 3 in Figure III.
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3.2 Exchange Rate Targeting
Unlike ination targeting, discretionary policy can be consistent with keeping the nominal ex-
change rate on target at all times.21 If the policy maker targets the nominal exchange rate,
complete stabilization can be achieved. However, this equilibrium is not unique and the policy-
maker may not be able to achieve complete stabilization of the nominal exchange rate.
The intuition for this result is similar to the one presented above. Exchange rate targeting
requires to stabilize prices of foreign goods. We can rewrite
E^t = PF;t   P t = S^t + PH;t   P t = S^t + H;t + PH;t 1   P t
= S^t + Et
1X
s=t
s tm^cs +
1
1  
t + PH;t 1   P t ;
which is similar to representation (26). Therefore, there is no surprise that we have several
paths for marginal costs each of which eventually stabilizes the nominal exchange rate. Figure 2
demonstrates the responses to a domestic cost push shock in two discretionary equilibria labelled
A and C.22 Responses are qualitatively similar to the corresponding equilibria under ination
targeting plotted in Figure 1, Panel I. However, there are quantitative di¤erences. In equilibrium
A the policymaker reduces the terms of trade as little as needed to generate a small negative
e¤ect of marginal costs on ination to match the increase in home price with the reduction in the
terms of trade to keep the nominal exchange rate exactly on target. In this equilibrium ination
rises by much more than under ination targeting in Figure 1, and this results in relatively large
welfare losses, see Table 3.
In equilibrium C the policymaker lowers the interest rate sharply. The nominal exchange rate
depreciates and is not kept on target. Nevertheless, this is a discretionary equilibrium consistent
21Much of NOEM literature (see e.g. Galí and Monacelli (2005)) demonstrates that it is possible under interest
rate rules.
22To obtain these equilibria we used the standard way of backwards induction (Oudiz and Sachs 1985). It
allows us to obtain equilibria which are jointly learnable, see Dennis and Kirsanova (2017). Iterations on the policy
reaction are not applicable, as we have more than one endogenous state variable. However, the discovered two
equilibria are su¢ cient to illustrate multiplicity of equilibria.
20
with the stabilization of the nominal exchange rate, as the policymaker is still able to keep the
nominal exchange rate stable on averagein response to a positive cost push shock. As soon as the
private sector expects that future policymakers will raise the interest rate and reduce the terms
of trade in response to a higher stock of net foreign assets, the current policymaker lowers the
interest rate, raises the terms of trade and therefore stimulates an accumulation of foreign assets.
It, therefore, delivers the expected future policy response, and validates the expectations of the
private sector. The stabilization is costly, as the volatility of all variables is substantial. However,
this strategy is consistent with the soft exchange rate target as it ensures the convergence back
towards the target in the medium term, see Figure 2. In other words, as it is less costly to validate
the expectations of the private sector than to accommodate them, the policymaker is trapped
in this equilibrium. Similar to the ination targeting regime the targeted variable is allowed to
deviate from the target, and the current policymaker perceives that the private sector expects
future policymakers to appreciate the nominal exchange rate, it will optimally choose to generate
a depreciation of the nominal exchange rate today.
Table 3: Multiple Discretionary Equilibria under Strict Exchange Rate Targeting
Policy Private sector Implied response Speed of Average
Eqm. Reaction Reaction of interest rate adjustment Loss

sp sd
  Up Ud
p d
 
ip id

max L;%C
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A

-0.6038 -0.0409
  -0.0462 0.1062
-0.3962 0.0409
 
0.0027 -0.0097

0.9532 0.1209
C

0.6537 -2.7121
  0.0064 -0.0053
0.0118 -0.8257
 
-0.4247 1.0971

0.6231 0.5437
Multiplicity is also preserved in the more general form of exchange rate targeting using the
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Figure 2: Soft Exchange Rate Targeting
hybrid objective (16). Table 4 reports losses for intermediate values of the relative weight on the
exchange rate target !e 2 (0; 1]. If !e = 0 the objective (16) coincides with ination targeting
objective (15). The losses in equilibria with !e > 0 are higher than under ination targeting.
Multiplicity, however, is eliminated if the policymaker is impatient. Equilibrium C arises
as there is a possibility to stabilize the exchange rate tomorrow. Table 5 reports our results of
reducing the policymakers discount factor, m in the objective (17). Once it is su¢ ciently small
(m . 0:03) the stable inferior equilibrium disappears.23 The best equilibrium is invariant to m:
Despite it is commonly suggested that currency pegging is an e¢ cient way to import low and
stable ination, it is apparent that in the case of a soft pegthe implied volatility of the nominal
exchange rate and domestic ination in the worst regime is higher than it is in the case of ination
targeting. This is not surprising: these are two second-bestscenarios, and there cannot be any
23This result was obtained numerically. Appendix G demonstrates that for m = 0 the nominal exchange rate is
always kept on target.
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Table 4: Multiplicity under Exchange Rate Targeting
!e 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.05 0.02 0.0
A 0.1209 0.1195 0.1171 0.1126 0.1006 0.0588 0.0328 0.0166
C 0.5437 0.5429 0.5417 0.5394 0.5336 0.5161 0.5087 0.4498
Table 5: E¤ect of Discounting under Exchange Rate Targeting
m 0.99 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.05 0.03 0.0
A 0.1209 0.1209 0.1209 0.1209 0.1209 0.1209 0.1209 0.1209
C 0.5437 0.5478 0.6038 0.8907 1.2740 1.6124 1.6608 
a priori ranking between them.
4 Conclusion
This paper demonstrates how multiple equilibria can occur in a small open economy model
with incomplete nancial markets under discretionary monetary policy. As current policymakers
cannot control the behavior of future policymakers nor the expectation of the private sector
coordination failures and expectation traps can occur. In our model policy makers need to decide
if the economy should be stabilized today or at some point in the future.
We believe that the presented model is capable of explaining recent empirical evidence on
exchange rate behavior: there can be switches between policy regimes that are characterized by
changes in the volatility of the nominal exchange rate. This can happen for a wide and realistic
class of policy objectives, as long as the policy maker acts under discretion and there is at least
one predetermined state variable in the system.
Although the presented model is highly stylized, and bringing it to the data is therefore beyond
the scope of this paper, a su¢ ciently complex model with these features will retain multiplicity of
23
equilibria and should be able to replicate the observed volatilities of key macroeconomic variables,
in particular the nominal exchange rate.
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